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Abstract. Decommitment is the action of foregoing of a contract for
another (superior) offer. It has been shown that, using decommitment,
agents can reach higher utility levels in case of negotiations with uncer-
tainty about future prospects. In this paper, we study the decommit-
ment concept for the novel setting of a large-scale logistics setting with
multiple, competing companies. Orders for transportation of loads are
acquired by agents of the (competing) companies by bidding in online
auctions. We find significant increases in profit when the agents can de-
commit and postpone the transportation of a load to a more suitable
time. Furthermore, we analyze the circumstances for which decommit-
ment has a positive impact if agents are capable of handling multiple
contracts simultaneously.
1 Introduction
A recent development is the investigation of application of multi-agent systems
(MASs) [7, 12, 25] in the logistics of the transportation sector, a challenging
area of application. The transportation sector is very competitive and profit
margins are typically low. Furthermore, planning of operations is a computa-
tionally intensive task which is classically centrally organized. Such centralized
solutions can however quickly become a bottleneck and do not lend themselves
well to changing situations, for example incidence management, or exploiting
new profitable opportunities. MASs can overcome these challenging difficulties
and offer new opportunities for profit by the development of robust, distributed
market mechanisms [4, 23, 14]. In this paper, we use as a model online, decen-
tralized auctions where agents bid for cargo in a MAS logistics setting. We study
a bidding strategy which is novel for such a large scale setting.
In [20, 1, 21], a leveled commitment protocol for negotiations between agents
is presented. Agents have the opportunity to unilaterally decommit contracts.
That is, they can forgo a previous contract for another (superior) offer. Sandholm
et al. have shown formally that by incorporating this decommitment option the
degree of Pareto efficiency of the reached agreements can increase as agents can
escape from premature local minima by adjusting their contracts. In this paper,
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decommitment is the possibility of an agent to forgo a previously won contract
for a transport in favor of a more profitable load.
We show in a series of computer experiments that significant increase in per-
formance (profit) can be realized by a company with agents who can decommit
loads, as opposed to a company with agents that only employ the option of
regular, binding bidding. As a necessary precondition for this gain, the experi-
ments show that decommitment is only a clearly superior strategy for an agent
close to the limit of its capacity. This is a new, general result for agents capa-
ble of handling simultaneous tasks. Furthermore, the increase in performance
for our (abstract) model can be seen as a lower bound for expected increased
performance in practice. We substantiate this claim through experiments that
show that the relative impact of a decommitment strategy increases with the
complexity of the world.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
transportation model that we use in this paper. The market mechanism is de-
scribed in Section 3. Section 4 details our application of decommitment in a
market setting. Section 5 discusses a required precondition for a successful de-
commitment strategy by an agent capable of handling multiple tasks concur-
rently. The computer experiments are presented in Section 6. Section 7 contains
concluding remarks.
2 The Transportation Model
In this section, we present the transportation model that is used in this paper.3
We have kept the transportation model, the market mechanism, and the struc-
ture of the bidding agents relatively simple to keep the analysis as transparent
as possible. Some extensions of the basic model are further discussed in Sec-
tion 6, where we show that performance can increase significantly when a de-
commitment strategy is used. We expect the (positive) effect of decommitment
to increase when the complexity of the transportation model increases as the
uncertainty of possible future events consequently increases. In Section 6.6 we
investigate some venues to substantiate this claim.
2.1 Outline
The world is a simple n by n grid. This world is populated by trucks, depots with
cargo, and competing companies. The trucks move over the grid and transport
cargo picked up at the depots to destinations on the grid. Each truck is coupled
with an agent that bids for cargo for its “own” truck.4 The trucks are each
owned by one of the companies. The performance of a company is measured by
the total profits made by its fleet of owned trucks. We consider (for simplicity
and to facilitate the analysis of the model’s results) that all companies consist
of the same number of (identical) trucks.
3 The computer model has been programmed in the Java programming language (ver-
sion 1.4). We thank Stefan Blom for allowing us to use the STW cluster at CWI.
4 In the text, we sometimes blur the line between the agent and its truck.
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2.2 Profits
Poot et al. [15] give an extensive list of performance measures for the transporta-
tion of cargo found in literature. The indicative performance measures from this
list that we consider are (i) the profit made as a function of the total number
of transported loads, (ii) the profit as a function of the bulk of the transported
loads, and (iii) the costs as a function of the distance traveled for the made
deliveries.
2.3 Loads
Loads for pickup prior to delivery by the trucks are locally aggregated at depots.
Such an aggregation procedure is for example used by UPS,5 where cargo is first
delivered to one of the nearby distribution centers. Warehousing, where goods
from multiple companies are collected for bundled transport, is another, growing
example. This aggregation can take place over relatively short distances or over
more substantial distances (e.g., in case of international transport). In general,
the origin of loads will not be randomly distributed but clustered, depending
on population centers and business locations [11]. We thus also consider depots
as abstractions of important population or business centers. Section 6 presents
such a model.
Like most regular mail services (e.g., UPS) and many wholesale suppliers,
we employ a model of “next day delivery”. In the simulations, each depot has
a number of loads available for transport at the start of the day. Furthermore,
new orders can also arrive for transport in the course of the day.
According to [27], transportation is dominantly limited in one dimension for
roughly 80% of the loads. In Europe, this dimension is volume; in the United
States this dimension is weight.[17] We hence use a model where we characterize
the cargo (and the carrying capacity of the trucks) in only one dimension, which
we, without loss of generality, call weight.
2.4 The Trucks
The trucks drive round trips in the course of a day. Each individual truck starts
from the same initial location each day, to return to this location at the end of
the day. Multiple round trips on the same day are allowed as long as sufficient
time remains to complete each trip the same day.
Alternative distributions of the trucks (e.g., dynamically changing over time)
can of course occur in practice. Such distributions, however, significantly com-
plicate the analysis of the model’s results, especially over multiple days. Further-
more, a repeating pattern is common as population and business centers do not
change dramatically overnight. In our simulations, the truck start their trips at
the depots. This is in line with the tendency of companies to base their trucks
close to the sources of cargo (to maximize operational profits).
5 See www.ups.com.
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Legal restrictions typically limit the number of hours that truck drivers can
work per day. There may also be a maximum distance which can be driven in
one day. In addition, speed limits need to be taken into account. We set the
length of a typical working day of eight hours. We also assume (for simplicity)
that the trucks travel with a constant “average” speed.
3 The Market Mechanism
Each piece of cargo is sold in a separate auction. Auctions for loads are held in
parallel and can continue over several rounds. The auctions continue until all
cargo is sold or until no further bids are placed by the agents in a round. After a
load is sold, it awaits pickup at its depot and is no longer available for bidding.
Agents are not allowed to bid for bundles of cargo. Such a combinatorial
auction type is as yet beyond the scope of our research because the number
of different bidding options is huge (around 300 pieces of cargo are sometimes
offered in the experiments, yielding an intractable number of bundles for each
of which traveling salesman problems have to be solved.).6 We also do not al-
low agents to participate simultaneously in multiple auctions with all implied
complications [16, 3, 26]. An agent’s valuation for a load is typically strongly
dependent on which other loads are won, and at what cost.7 For this reason,
and for the sake of computational feasibility, we allow each agent to place a bid
for at most one load in each round of auctions. Our agents can thus be seen as
computationally and rationally bounded (in the sense of [20, 30, 22]), although
they repair (some of) their non-optimal local decisions through a decommitment
strategy (see Section 4).
Each piece of cargo is sold in a separate Vickrey auction. In this auction type,
the highest bidder wins the contract but pays the second-highest price.8 In our
model, neither the number of participants nor the submitted bids are revealed by
the auctioneer.9 An attractive property of the one-shot (private-value) Vickrey
auction is that it is a (weakly) dominating strategy to bid the true valuation for
the good [29, 8].10 Another attractive property of the Vickrey auction is that
6 Determining the winners of a combinatorial auction is NP-complete. There has re-
cently been a surge of research in this area, however. A fast algorithm for winner
determination has for instance been proposed in [24].
7 Schillo et al. analyzed the risk of over-bidding when participating in simultaneous
auctions and propose a strategy with a constrained number of decommitments (and
associated penalties).
8 Ties are broken at random.
9 We do not use or reveal sensitive business information in our market mechanism.
When extensions of the model are considered (e.g., models where companies receive
information about their competitors’ actions and behavior) privacy issues should be
taken into account.
10 It is important to note here that the Vickrey auction has some known deficiencies.
Furthermore, limitations of the protocol may arise when the Vickrey protocol is used
for automated auctions and bidding is done by computational agents [19]. These
aspects deserve further attention for future implementations.
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a limited amount of communication between the auctioneer and the bidders is
required (as opposed to, for example, the “open-cry” English auction).
The agents use the following strategy in each bidding round. First, they
determine the valuation of each piece of cargo which is offered in an auction. The
valuation of an added load is equal to added profit for this load (the amount of
money which the truck receives when the load is delivered minus the additional
costs associated with the new path). The application of more elaborate valuation
functions can also be useful. For example, the value of a load can increase when
the truck, by transporting the extra load, can move cheaply to an area of the
grid with a high density of depots. Another venue of research is in the line of
COIN [28, 13], where the aim would be to modify the agents’ valuation function
to let them more efficiently cooperate as one company. Such refinements of the
agent’s valuation function form an interesting topic for further studies.
There is however obviously an incentive for a company to avoid competition
between its own trucks. As part of its strategy, each company therefore makes a
pre-selection that determines which agents are allowed to bid for the company in
each auction. In this pre-selection phase, the company compares the valuations
of the company’s agents for the available cargo. The agent with the highest
valuation (overall) then bids (its valuation) in the proper auction. This auction
is then closed for other agents of the same firm. In this manner, we eliminate the
possibility that the no. 2 in the auction, who determines the price, is an agent
from the same company. The company then repeats this procedure to select a
second agent, which is allowed to bid in another auction, etc. Using this strategy,
the agents of a company distribute themselves over a larger set of auctions than
would otherwise be the case. This, in general, also increases the competition
between the trucks of different companies.
4 The Decommitment Option
Contracts are typically binding in traditional multi-agent negotiation protocols
with self interested agents. In [20, 23, 1], a more general protocol with continu-
ous levels of commitment is proposed and analyzed. The key ingredient of this
protocol is the option to break an agreement, in favor of, hopefully, a better
deal, at the possible cost of a prenegotiated penalty. In our the experiments,
an agent with a decommitment strategy can improve its immediate profits by
bidding for a new load with the additional possibility to discard a load to which
it committed earlier. The agent is hence more flexible in the choice of loads to
choose to bid on, at the cost of discarding a previously won bid.
Trust and reputation are however of importance in the world of (electronic)
contract negotiation [10, 5]. A bad track-record can, for example, lead to the
shunning of a party in negotiations. How an auctioneer or a client will change
its attitude towards a party which in the past has decommitted from a negoti-
ated contract has to be quantified for specific areas of application. For example,
for many bulk transports, a delayed delivery is not too detrimental as another
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transporter can easily be found and the transport does not have a tight delivery
schedule. This is however not the case for expensive, quickly perishable goods.
In our market mechanism, we circumvent the above quantification issue. We
achieve this by delivering decommitted cargo by a truck of the same company as
the truck that decommitted the load (with consideration of delivery constraints).
We thus “hide” the process of rejecting deals from the customer who offered the
load at auction: a truck only postpones the transport of decommitted cargo until
another truck of the same company becomes available. A company that uses
a decommitment strategy in this fashion retains its reputation and performs
according to the contract. For more complex scenario’s (not considered here)
where there is no “hiding” the decommitment and where a good cost function is
available to quantify the impact of decommitment on trust, we however expect
the benefits of a decommitment strategy to increase. The agents then have more
options available to optimize their choice of loads.
The “hiding” of the decommitment strategy is achieved by internal reauction-
ing of loads. Decommitted cargo is once again offered in a Vickrey auction. This
auction is, however, only accessible for agents of the company which should de-
liver the load. The auctions for decommitted cargo thus serve as internal re-sale
markets for companies. Effectively, through a “hidden” decommitment strategy,
tasks are redistributed between the agents of one company. Implicitly, the agents
renegotiate their concurrent plans.
The bids for decommitted cargo are made in terms of “blue”(i.e., fake) money
as the contract for transportation has already been won by the company. We
however require that new bids for decommitted cargo (in terms of blue money)
exceed the original bid costs (in terms of real or “green” money). This rule is
used to ensure that the original bidding costs for winning the decommitted load
in the original auction are covered. As an alternative, a decommitted load could
be offered in a public auction to other companies, i.e. outsourcing, a common
practice in the transportation world. The internal resale auctions of decommitted
loads are held in parallel with the public auctions as experiments showed that
this as a good approach to maintain a sufficient degree of competition with the
other companies on the auctions for publicly available loads.
For simplicity and from a computational viewpoint, we allow agents to dis-
card only one load in each round of bidding. Furthermore, only loads which have
been won but are not yet picked up can be discarded, to avoid the possible extra
cost of unloading. Decommitment is hence an administrative action.
Furthermore, we do not allow agents to decommit cargo which must be de-
livered today (see Section 2.1) to minimize the chance of a too-late delivery.
Additionally, we have constrained the possible backlog of decommitted loads by
only allowing a decommitment by an individual truck if the total number of
currently unassigned, decommitted loads does not exceed the number of trucks
in the company.11 This approach leads to good results: In the computational
experiments less than 0.2% of the decommitted loads were delivered too late.
11 Alternative, more sophisticated heuristics are a topic of research.
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Penalties for too-late delivery will hence have to be exorbitant in order to offset
the benefits of decommitment presented in Section 6.
5 Conditions for Decommitment
We observe in the computational experiments that decommitment of a load
occurs predominantly when trucks are close to filling their maximum capacity.
To understand this result, it is useful to first consider two extreme situations:
(i) an extreme shortage of available cargo and (ii) an extreme excess of available
cargo (relative to the carrying capacity of the trucks).
In case of an extreme shortage of loads, a truck will not decommit a load as
it has a large excess capacity: it is more profitable to add a load to a relatively
empty truck than to replace one load by another one. In the other case of a large
selection of loads to choose from, a new load, which (closely) fills the remaining
capacity of the truck is mostly available. Again, decommitment does not occur
as adding a load which fits is more profitable than fine tuning profits at the cost
of another load which is dropped.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of decommitment for a range of offered loads
for a single truck to bid on. We plot the number of transported loads as a
function of the number of loads presented. On the far left, the number of available
loads is low. As a consequence, the available loads are almost all picked up and
transported. If the production rate increases, we move to the right in Figure 1.
The (positive) effect of decommitment then increases, until the trucks reach their
capacity limits. On the far right in Figure 1, the number of offered loads is very
high. In this case (an excess of cargo), the added value of decommitment also
decreases as the maximum number of tasks that the truck is able to handle can
be achieved. Note that for specific scenario’s a slightly higher performance can
be reached than without the use of a decommitment strategy, but in the limit
of available loads (tasks) the added benefit of decommitment will disappear.
Hence, we hypothesize a decommitment strategy is most beneficial when a
truck is close to reaching its maximum capacity and has a limited number of extra
tasks to choose from. We believe this is a general result for an agent capable of
doing multiple tasks in parallel. This hypothesis must be kept in mind when
evaluating whether to apply a decommitment strategy.
In our experiments, we observe for a company with multiple trucks, the use
of a decommitment strategy only has a strongly positive effect when a significant
fraction of its trucks actually decommit loads. When the supply of loads during
one day approximately matches the carrying capacity of the trucks, the above
condition is met. We note in real-life situations that there are often economic
incentives which drive the market to such a balanced situation, if supply and
demand do not match. Hence, a decommitment strategy can be expected to have
an impact in real markets.
In our simulations, we keep the number of companies and trucks constant
when observing the performance of the companies over a number of days. In case
of a balanced market, this implies that the amount of cargo which is transported
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Fig. 1. The added value of decommitment for a wide range of number of offered
loads for one truck. The decommitment strategy only has a strong impact for a
subset of the range of number of offered loads.
per day is relatively constant. To this end, we search for an equilibrium “produc-
tion” of new cargo. In a sense, this is a reversion of the normal market operation.
The addition or removal of a truck is however an operation with a large impact.
It is not straightforward to formulate criteria in terms of profits which make the
addition/removal of a truck an issue, especially over a short time period. Fur-
thermore, differentiation between the various companies in composition makes
evaluation of the experiments non trivial. We hence set the production level at
a good initial estimate and adapt towards the equilibrium for the strategy used.
We in our experiments achieve this equilibrium in supply and demand by set-
ting the production level of loads to match the approximate carrying capacity of
the trucks, while as yet not using a decommitment strategy. An initial number of
loads is generated and new loads are produced in the course of the day. The level
of production is chosen so as to arrive at a constant number of loads available
for transport the next day (within 5% of the initial number of loads available).
When this constraint is met, the number of loads and the carrying capacity of
the trucks on the grid are in equilibrium over the days of the simulation. With
the derived production schedules, we rerun the experiments, but with the addi-
tional possibility of a truck to decommit an earlier won bid. The performance
of the regular bidding strategy versus the decommitment strategy can then be
calculated.
6 Results
In this section, we study the performance of a companies who uses a decommit-
ment strategy relative to companies which do not. Section 6.1 contains results
for a Sugarscape-like model. In this model, the edges of the transportation grid
are connected (to suppress boundary effects). In Section 6.2 we consider a finite-
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size model with a Gaussian distribution of the production. In Sections 6.1–6.4,
we further investigate the effect of decommitment for these two models (as a
function of the number of depots, the number of trucks per depot, the number
of decommitting firms, etc.). Special cases of the models are presented in Sec-
tions 6.5 and 6.6. Similar results for the above two models were also found using
benchmark data from www.opsresearch.com and
www.sintef.no/static/am/opti/projects/top/vrp/ for
location of depots and scheduling of loads. We feel that our results hence hold
for a wide scheme of settings as long as the number of offered loads meets the
requirements given in Section 5.
In the experiments, the performance of the bidding strategies is tested over a
period of days (15) in order to measure not only immediate performance but also
the effect of a bid (or decommitment) over a longer time period. All companies
place an equal number of trucks at each depot for fair competition. Unless stated
otherwise, we use one truck per depot per company. See also Appendix A for
settings of the experiments.
6.1 The Sugarscape Model
We first consider a “Sugarscape-like”grid [6]. Like in Sugarscape, we connect
the edges of the grid (to suppress boundary effects). In addition, trucks can
only move along the grid lines (i.e., they cannot move diagonally). We place
the depots with equal spacing on the grid (the distance is 2 nodes); each depot
also has the same production rate. With these assumptions, we obtain a highly
symmetric “transportation world”.
The performance of the Sugarscape model for one company without and with
a decommitment strategy is summarized in Table 1 for respectively 4, 9, and 25
depots. We consider two companies in these experiments of which only one can
use a decommitment strategy. In Table 1, we report the number of transported
loads and the profit that is generated (in 1000 monetary units), with and without
use of a decommitment strategy. Note that the grid is already filled densely in
case of 25 depots (out of 100 possible locations). Competition between the two
companies then becomes intense and profit margins drop as competition in the
auctions increases.
6.2 A Gaussian Distribution Model
The Sugarscape transportation model of Section 6.1 is highly stylized. For exam-
ple, boundary effects are suppressed by using a toroidal grid, depots are equally
spaced, production is uniform, and trucks can only move along the grid lines.
We investigate in this section whether the decommitment strategy also works
for a transportation model which does not make these limiting assumptions.
This alternative model consists of a plain square grid. The trucks can move
in arbitrary directions on the grid, as long as they do not exceed the grid’s
boundaries. The depots are placed at random locations on the grid. Furthermore,
we do no longer assume that production is uniform. Instead, we assume that
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Table 1. Results for a Sugarscape model.
depots decommitment? loads profit
4 no 940 91
4 yes 987 99
increase 5% 8.7%
9 no 1826 420
9 yes 1920 446
increase 5.1% 10.6%
25 no 3704 585
25 yes 4197 627
increase 10.6% 7.1%
the spatial production rate follows a Gaussian distribution (with its peak in
the center of the grid) and then assign each new load to the nearest depot
for transportation12. Such a model is representative of a large city or a major
business center which is surrounded by smaller cities or businesses [11]. The
remainder of this paper discusses results obtained for this model.
Figure 2 shows the profits made by a company (with and without the use of a



















Fig. 2. Profits made by a company (with and without decommitment) as a
function of the number of depots on the grid.
the positive effect of decommitment on a company’s profit. This effect becomes
especially large in case of a densely filled grid. In the experiments, we observed
on average one decommitment per truck per day, increasing to a maximum of
three per day for a densely filled grid. Results for more than two companies show
similar trends for the decommitting company. Figure 3 shows that the number of
transported loads also increases when a company uses a decommitment strategy.
12 Production is maximized by maximizing the standard deviation of the Gaussian.























Fig. 3. Number of transported loads as a function of the number of depots on
the grid. Decommitment has a clear positive effect: the number of carried loads
increases significantly.
It is also important to note that the use of decommitment by one company
can decrease the performance of the non-decommitting companies. This loss can
amount to half the increase in profit of the company who uses a decommitment
strategy. This effect is of importance when the margin for survival is small and
under-performing companies may be removed from the field.
6.3 Multiple Trucks Per Depot
In the previous experiments, only one truck per company was stationed at each
depot. Figure 4 shows how a firm’s profit depends on the number of trucks per
depot, with and without decommitment. Note that the effect of the decommit-
ment strategy clearly increases as the number of trucks on the grid increases.
6.4 Multiple Decommitting Firms
The previous results show that the use of a decommitment strategy can be ben-
eficial for a company. Stated otherwise, decommitment can give a company a
competitive edge in an otherwise symmetric market. Intelligent opponents are,
however, not static and counter measures can be expected if a firm uses a supe-
rior strategy [9, 18]. For instance, competitors can also adopt a decommitment
strategy once this strategy has proven its usefulness.
We have studied what happens if multiple companies use a decommitment
strategy. Experimental results show improvements for each decommitting com-
pany, as in Figs. 2 and 3. In general, it is thus attractive for a company to
use a decommitment strategy. The absolute performance of the decommitment
strategy increases slightly as more companies adopt this tactic. However, as can
be expected, the relative increase in performance with respect to the competing
companies drops with a growing number of decommitters.





















Fig. 4. Influence of the number of trucks per depot on the profit made by a
company, with and without decommitment. The number of trucks per depot is
indicated in the figure’s key.
6.5 Depot-to-Depot Routing
An interesting modification of the transportation model is to restrict the desti-
nation of loads to depots. This is a typical scenario in a factory setting where
produced items are inputs for other production processes, similar to supply chain
management. Such a scenario can also be relevant in case of international trans-






















Fig. 5. The effect of decommitment in case of depot-to-depot (DtD) routing.
In Figure 5, we show results with and without depot-to-depot routing. Note
that the profits increase in case of depot-to-depot routing as there is a stronger
bundling in the destinations of the goods. Consequently, more efficient routes
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can be driven. The impact of the decommitment strategy also increases, as the
shuffling of loads within an existing route is facilitated.
6.6 Alternative Settings
In this final section, we investigate two changes in the transportation model
which further increase the impact of the decommitment strategy. We first con-
sider a price function for which the correct prediction of future loads becomes
more important due to a greater difference in the price of individual loads. Sec-
ondly, we investigate the impact of restricting the available information to the
agents by limiting the distance over which an agent can sample the grid for
available loads.
In Figure 6, we show the strong relative increase in profits when a quadratic




















Fig. 6. The effect of decommitment in case of linear and nonlinear (quadratic)
price functions.
for delivery increases sharply as the deadline for delivery approaches. In both
cases there is a strong incentive for agents to correctly anticipate which profitable
loads will still appear.
Additional experiments also show that the effect of decommitment increases if
the truck’s agents are more “myopic”. Truck agents can decide to limit their bid-
ding range due to communication overhead or a lack of computational resources.
In Figure 7, we show the impact of decommitment when an agent only considers
loads for pickup which are not too far away from its current location.14 This
figure shows that the absolute and relative impact of decommitment increases in
13 The price for a load l is 40 + weight(l)2 + distance(l), instead of the linear price
function given in Appendix A.
14 We use an operating range of one quarter of the size of the grid.























Fig. 7. The role of decommitment in case of “myopic” bidding agents.
this case, as an agent is less able to observe the available loads and thus makes
less optimal choices in the course of time, which need to be repaired.
7 Conclusions and Discussion
We study the use of a decommitment strategy in case of on-line bidding for cargo
by agents in a multi-company, multi-depot transportation setting. In our model,
an agent bidding for a truck can decommit a load in lieu of a more favorable
item of cargo. We observe significant increases in profit that scale with the size of
operations and uncertainty of future prospects. The observed profit margins are
significant in the competitive market of transport where a 4% profit is considered
exceptional. For example, the average profit margin before taxes for the Dutch
road transport sector (from 1989 to 1999) was only 1.6% [27]. Adoption of a
decommitment strategy can thus give a company a significant edge.
For specific applications beyond that of our model and for novel areas, the
added value of decommitment, and the circumstances where it can be applied
successfully should be studied further. However, based upon our computational
experiments, we hypothesize that the positive impact of a decommitment strat-
egy increases with the complexity of the operating domain, as it then becomes of
greater importance to have the opportunity to roll-back a previous sub optimal
decision [21].
We also observe that decommitment has the highest impact when an agent
is close to its maximum capacity for handling multiple contracts in parallel.
With sufficient capacity, it is often more beneficial to add an extra contract than
to replace a won contract in favor of a superior offer. Hence, for multi-agent
systems where agents are capable of handling several tasks simultaneously, a
decommitment strategy can be expected to have its largest impact when the
agents are operated at (almost) full capacity.
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A Experimental Settings
For each experiment, we averaged the results over 60 runs and 15 consecutive
days. We applied the Wilcoxon test to verify that the reported effects of decom-
mitment are statistically significant.
We set the distance between two adjacent nodes of the grid equal to 20 km.
By default, the grid size is equal to 10∗10. In the Sugarscape-like model studied
in Section 6.1, the grid size is depending on the number of depots (to ensure a
uniform spacing between them).
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The (average) speed of all trucks is equal to 70 km/hour. The carrying ca-
pacity of the trucks is set at 350 units of weight. The weight of the loads is in
the range of 10 to 70.
The price for a load l is set equal to 40 + 2 ∗ weight(l) + distance(l) where
the transportation distance for a load l is the distance from the origin of the
load to its destination, and where weight denotes the size of the load. This
cost function is derived from UPS (see www.ups.nl). UPS uses a constant fee
plus a weight-proportional term for its standard packages. We also added a cost
per distance. This improved performance (with and without decommitment) as
distance then became a stronger issue in bidding. The cost for movement per
km is one currency unit.
It is important to note that we set the price for delivery independent of
the moment that a load is offered for transport. The price does therefore not
increase as the time window for delivery shrinks. This ensures that the results
of our experiments are not biased to show good results for decommitment. With
increasing prices (close to the delivery time) there is otherwise an incentive for
trucks to favor new loads with tight deadlines due to higher profits.
